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| *2000:La "destinée manifeste" des États-Unis au XIXème siècle | *2000:La "destinée manifeste" des États-Unis au XIXème siècle | ||
| *1999: The Wilson Years (1964-1970) | *1999: The Wilson Years (1964-1970) | ||
| - | *1998: Les médias et l'information aux Etats-Unis depuis 1945 | + | *1998: Les médias et l'information aux Etats-Unis depuis 1945 ''Faites un commentaire critique de cet extrait de The Press and the Presidency écrit par John TEBBEL et Sarah H. WATTS, et publié en 1985 : "Nixon's method of dealing with press and television had been on display long before he came to the White House. These incidents had certainly conditioned his attitude toward the media and shown him the way they could be used to seize power and influence voters. He discovered the power of the press to set events in motion when his part in the unlikely discovery of the incriminating "pumpkin papers" led to the trial of Alger Hiss. Here was a real discovery. A young and relatively obscure congressman could become a national figure overnight simply by having his name associated with a major event. As vice-presidential candidate on the Eisenhower ticket, and more accomplished by this time, Nixon had employed basic emotional appeals in the famous Checkers speech, as noted earlier, to vindicate himself when he was first charged with deception. Later, as vice-president, there would be the Kitchen Debate with Premier Nikita Khrushchev, where the image of confrontation, not what was said or done, would be used to create a positive public reaction. But Nixon rehearsed much of what was to follow when he confronted the assembled reporters after the race for the governorship of Califomia and told them, like a defiant child, "You won't have Dick Nixon to kick around any more," expressing both his masochism and paranoia toward the press in blaming it for his defeat. Thus Nixon entered the White House with press relationships already determined not only by virtue of his personality (which continues to be dissected as though it were a perpetual cadaver) but by those attitudes toward the press that he had long since made clear. Battle lines had been drawn, as they had not been in any previous administration. In the subsequent struggle a large portion of the public continued to believe, as it does today, that Nixon was victimized by a hostile, Eastern Establishment press, full of liberals and quite possibly dictated to by the Kremlin. Part of this continuing trust in Nixon was a result of the deep division over Vietnam, but a significant portion arose from the increasing public unwillingness, beginning with Kennedy and Johnson, to believe that presidents could and did lie and manipulated the public through the media. Unlike Johnson, Nixon well understood these attitudes, and in time he developed the means to exploit them, with the intention of further discrediting a press he had given up trying to control. He also developed numerous protective devices to conceal what he and his closest associates were doing, meanwhile, as we know now, also paradoxically creating the means to disclose everything, or nearly everything. If the Johnson White House had been Byzantine in its operations, it had remained within the context of American politics; with Nixon, it came close to being clinically institutional." John TEBBEL, Sarah M. WATTS, ''The Press and the Presidency'', New York, Oxford University Press, 1985.'' |
| [[Category: Concours - Archives]] | [[Category: Concours - Archives]] | ||
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Programmes du Capes Externe 2000-2011
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